International Relations
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Introduction

Consider the following claims: “Germany invades Belgium,” “The United States imposes economic sanctions on Iraq,” “Russia threatens to cut off Ukraine's gas supplies,” “The United Kingdom and Argentina are locked into a territorial dispute over the status of the Falkland Islands,” “Germany develops assistance programs aimed at Malawi and Rwanda,” etc. Those claims describe the stuff of international relations. They imply, on the face of it, that states are actors in the same way as individuals are: they reflect, make decisions, change course when required, and so on.

Up until World War I, relations between states were analyzed by philosophers, lawyers, political scientists, and historians. The twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of the study of international relations as an academic discipline in its own right, with its own methodologies and traditions. It has also witnessed the articulation of a particularly rich and complex body of literature, standardly gathered under the heading of international relations theory – IR theory for short – a convenient terminological umbrella for a wide variety of theories. We shall explore some of the similarities and differences between a selection of those theories presently. All theories of IR affirm that relationships between international actors can be explained by reference to the nature of individuals, and to the ways in which those individuals – as citizens, political leaders, members of military, etc. – act collectively. Moreover, although they appear mostly to describe and explain facts about human nature and collective action in the international realm, they also tackle what I shall call the “normative question in IR.” By the normative question, I mean the following: (a) To what extent do international actors consider themselves to be subject to moral norms in their dealings with one another? (b) Are international actors, in fact, bound by moral norms? Some theories of international relations explicitly consider both issues, while others focus more on the former. My aim in this essay is to review major theories of international relations in the light of the two prongs of the “normative question.”

The role of norms in international relations is one of the most interesting and intriguing issues raised by theories of international relations. For those theories ultimately rely on accounts of human nature as one of the main explanatory factors for the conduct of international actors. Yet, whereas the claim that individuals ought to abide by certain moral norms in their relationships to one another is utterly uncontroversial, whether states are similarly bound continues to be fiercely debated, notwithstanding the development of an increasingly rich and morally laden international law.
Before I proceed, a few caveats are in order. First, IR theory is a bewilderingly complex field, divided as it is between (*inter alia*) classical realism, neorealism, constructivism, Marxism, liberal internationalism, neoliberalism, green theory of IR, logical positivism in IR, anti-positivism, and so on. I cannot hope to do justice to those various strands and substrands here, and instead will focus on the schools of thought which (in Western academia) have shaped the debate from the end of World War I in 1919 to the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s: liberal internationalism, realism, the English school, and constructivism. I shall end with some remarks on the so-called “normative turn,” which refers to the renewal since the early 1990s of international ethics as a strand of IR theory. In order to bring to light similarities and differences between those various theories, I shall use the case of humanitarian intervention and show how those schools can deal with it (see humanitarian intervention).

Second, and relatedly, debates in IR theory pertain to a much wider range of issues than I will consider here, to wit (again, *inter alia*): (a) Actors in international relations – should IR theory regard states as their primary focus or should it also seek to explain and understand the behavior of international institutions, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations? (b) Acts and conducts in international relations: should IR theory focus on explaining and understanding those actors’ military policy, or should it also analyze their economic and trade policies? Should it seek to provide an account of globalization? Of patterns of nonmilitary conflicts and solidarities? (c) Methods in IR theory: can IR theory rely on scientific methods alone? Indeed does it even have the status of a social scientific inquiry? (d) Should IR theory press other disciplines into service, such as history, law, economics in general and international political economy in particular, sociology, and philosophy? A full account of international relations would need to tackle those various questions. To reiterate, however, I shall concentrate on the normative question. (For useful reviews of some of those debates, see Dunne et al. 2007; Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008; Jackson and Sørensen 2007.)

Third, although I examine IR theories as have been articulated in twentieth-century anglophone academia, their traditional and core subject matter – relations between politically sovereign communities – has always been at the heart of much of Western, and non-Western, intellectual traditions. I shall refer to the historical roots of those theories as I go along.

**Liberal Internationalism**

The 1919 Treaty of Versailles, in which the victorious allies of World War I set the terms for peace with Germany and her allies, established the League of Nations, whose stated purpose was to maintain peace among signatories. In the immediate aftermath of the bloodiest interstate conflict in recorded history, statesmen, policy-makers, and academics alike took it for granted that such a conflict should never be allowed to happen again. However, it was necessary to understand how it could have happened in the first place. It is no coincidence that in that very same year, the
University of Aberystwyth in Wales established the first Chair of International Relations in the anglophone world.

Those two events illustrate the descriptive and prescriptive features of IR theories – features which, as we shall see throughout, are more or less prominent in some theories than others, indeed are often in tension with each other. That said, liberal internationalism is unashamedly and unreservedly prescriptive. While the establishment of the League of Nations at President Wilson’s initiative is undoubtedly its most significant instantiation pre-1945 (as indeed the League’s failure in 1939 marked its relative demise in academia until twenty years ago or so), its intellectual roots as a distinct theory of international relations can be traced as far back as Cicero’s cosmopolitanism, but most notably in Kant’s seminal essay “Project on a Perpetual Peace” (see Kant, Immanuel; cosmopolitanism). In fact, one can discern two waves of liberal internationalism: the first one goes from World War I to the mid-1930s, and the second (to which I shall return in the final section) starts from the end of the Cold War and is still an important strand within IR theory.

Across its many variants, liberal internationalism can be summarized as follows. Human beings are subject to their passions, fears, and appetites. But they also have the power rationally to determine their own actions, and in particular to do what is right, even when doing the right thing conflicts with what they want. The realm of the right is delineated by a set of universal moral principles. Those principles are discoverable by reason and are binding on all human beings irrespective of time and place. More precisely, individuals, rather than states, are the primary locus of moral concern and respect. They all have rights to some fundamental freedoms and a basic level of subsistence, wherever they reside. States, for their part, do not have normative status as such, but are legitimate only to the degree to which they respect and promote those rights. On the international stage, they are under strong obligations to respect one another’s right to self-determination (which in turn imposes on them an obligation not to wage aggressive wars), and to cooperate with one another for the sake of promoting peace for all. International organizations such as the League of Nations prior to 1939, or the United Nations since 1945, are the best vehicle to facilitate such cooperation, for which free trade, or as contemporary thinkers would call it, globalization, provides optimal conditions – insofar as it exposes politically sovereign peoples to one another and promises prosperity for all. If all states were liberal democracies, liberal internationalists argue, the world would be a better place. Moreover, it is possible for states to become liberal democracies, because it is possible for human beings to be motivated by the power of reason to act justly toward one another. To act justly toward others, according to internationalists, is to recognize their status as free and equals and to provide the conditions under which they can live as free and equals. Only in a liberal democracy can those conditions obtain, since it is only in liberal democracies that individuals can jointly shape their collective future and that their individual rights are respected (Panke and Risse 2007; key contemporary texts are Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989; Fukuyama 1992; Held 1995).

Thus, commitment to human rights, skepticism as to the moral relevance of national borders, belief in the justificatory power of reason, and aspirations toward a better,
more peaceful world, are the hallmark of liberal internationalism. To realists, as we shall see presently, they are also its downfall as a prescriptive theory of international relations. It is worth noting, however, that liberal internationalism has been criticized from nonrealist perspectives for its indifference to non-Western ethics and, concomitantly, its ideological imperialism. Much of the contemporary liberal international agenda is thus given over to tackling this criticism and to showing that liberal internationalism consists in a genuinely universal set of values. (For a recent collection on the so-called East-Asian challenge to Western human rights, see Bauer and Bell 1999; for good examples of liberal international responses, see Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000.)

As should be clear from the foregoing remarks, humanitarian intervention poses specific problems for liberal internationalism. On the one hand, liberal internationalism is committed to the norm of nonaggression and the imperative to promote peace. On the other hand, it endorses the view that all individuals are free and equals and ought to be treated as such. To what extent then ought the prohibition against aggression be respected when individuals are victims of grievous human rights violations at the hands of their own regime? In fact, if states’ legitimacy is dependent upon their ability and willingness to treat their own members as free and equal, it is not altogether clear whence the prohibition against aggression stems from. It would seem, on the contrary, that as long as the world is not wholly constituted by liberal democracies, the burden of proof ought to reside not on the shoulders of those who defend aggression as a means to bring about freedom and equality for all but, rather, on those who wish to resist it.

**Realism**

Although liberal internationalism dominated the intellectual agenda in the 1920s and early 1930s, its foil and counterpart, realism, gained ascendancy after World War II. Against the utopian promises of a theory seemingly oblivious to the constraints of world politics, realists claim to offer measured and hard-nosed accounts of human nature, internal politics, and international politics. While Kant is the internationalists’ precursor, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau are undoubtedly the founding fathers of realism (see Machiavelli, Niccolò; Hobbes, Thomas; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques). According to realists, individuals are above all driven by their desperate wish to survive. Within states, the resulting conflicts can be managed and resolved relatively harmoniously through political structures. By contrast, the international realm is characterized by the absence of an overarching and coercive world government. Under those anarchic circumstances, conflicts between states admit of no ordered peaceful solution other than willed by states themselves. However, states are uncertain as to which courses of action other states will take, and in particular whether they will honor their treaty obligations. It is thus in the rational interest of each to increase their abilities to further their own goals and to impose their will on others – primarily by arming themselves but also by expanding their sphere of economic influence. Power (see Power) pressed into the service of the pursuit of self-interested and exogenously formed preferences:
this is both what states seek and what explains – in the manner of a physical law – conflicts between them.

This brief sketch, broadly faithful as it is to the views of main realist thinkers such as E. H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, K. Waltz, and J. Mearsheimer, might give the impression that for realists, states' conduct in their dealings with one another, as channeled through statesmen's actions, is not amenable to moral evaluation (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948, 1958, 1965; Waltz 1959, 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). While the verdict is somewhat opposite in Waltz's and Mearsheimer's cases, it would be misleading in Carr's and Morgenthau's. To be sure, they insist that, as a matter of fact, states' actions are normally governed by individuals' desire for power. They also insist that universal moral norms are not benchmarks for statesmen's conduct in the international realm. At the same time, however, they make the following, unambiguously prescriptive claims: (1) as a matter of prudence, states may decide to reject those universal norms if abiding by them would prevent them from pursuing their own interest; (2) statesmen are not merely prudentially directed and morally permitted to pursue their country's interests but have a special moral obligation, as leaders, to their fellow citizens to do so; (3) it is in the interests of the powerful to justify their actions by reference to those norms; (4) those norms provide the raw material through which states can construct their localized (in time and space) understanding of what their self-interest requires. Returning to the two-pronged normative question with which we began, realists such as Carr and Morgenthau argue that international actors do indeed see themselves as bound by moral norms (in this instance, norms prescribing the pursuit of the national interest), and that they are so bound. Clearly, thus, there is space for ethics in a realist world: an ethics which is based on the pursuit of self-interest and which is contingent on or at least constrained by prudential considerations – but an ethics nonetheless (Donnelly 2008; Hutchings 1999: Ch. 1).

With respect to humanitarian intervention, thus, realists would insist that leaders ought not to wage such a war if doing so would harm the national interest. They may do so, however, if it promotes it. The case of India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 is a case in point, at least on some accounts of that war. In the 1970 Pakistani general elections, the East-Pakistani Awami League, which was campaigning for the regional autonomy of East Pakistan vis-à-vis Karachi, won most of the seats in that region. The League's leader demanded the right to form the government – a request which was turned down by Premier General Bhutto. Following weeks of increasing dissent and armed clashes between the League and the Pakistani army, the latter mounted a crack-down on the League and their supporters, accompanied by mass rapes and mass murders of civilians. As a result, millions of East Pakistanis crossed into India, placing an enormous strain on the latter's overburdened economy and infrastructure. India's invasion of Pakistan's eastern territory in December 1971 was described then as retaliation against Pakistani air strikes in North-Western India. However, the steps India took prior to those air strikes to arm and train members of the League can be read as the incipient stages of a planned intervention into Pakistan aimed not merely, or not so much, at redressing the plight of Eastern Pakistanis, but rather at protecting India's interests from unrest in Pakistan (Wheeler 2002: Ch. 2).
From a realist point of view, India’s leaders, most notably Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, far from acting in furtherance of universally valid and binding moral norms, were simply doing what leaders must do – to wit, promote the fundamental interests of their fellow citizens.

The English School

So far, we have examined two theories of international relations which, in their more extreme variants, seemingly stand at polar opposites of the moral spectrum. The English School – thus named because its founders, though not all English, nevertheless gained their reputation and made their careers while working in British universities – emerged in the mid-1950s as a self-avowed and dissatisfied response to the liberal internationalism of the interwar period on the one hand, and to the realism of the late 1930s and the Cold War on the other hand. Its central tenets can be usefully summarized as follows (Bull 1995; Buzan 2004; Dunne 1998; Jackson 2000; Linklater 2005; Wight 1991). First, IR theory should focus, not on states alone and on the law-like patterns which allegedly characterize their interactions but, rather, on the structure and texture of the international society which, together with many other actors (subnational communities, international organizations, private nonprofit institutions, and individuals) they constitute. Second, in order to understand international relations, one must be attentive to the historical context against which they unfold. In particular, one must be mindful of the ways in which the main actors of international relations understand both their role and their behavior at a particular point in time. Third, and relatedly, one must pay attention to the moral values which the international society seeks to promote.

Against realists, thus, the English School – which claims Grotius as its intellectual inspiration – holds that there is far greater cooperation and good will between states than the former are willing to admit (see GROTIIUS, HUGO). Against liberal internationalists, it argues that war is and always will be a constant threat to world order and that perpetual peace is a utopia. It also stresses that groups, particularly states, and their interactions, are the primary explanandum of IR theory – not individuals themselves. This is not to say that the international arena is free from moral judgments. On the contrary, members of the international society – foremost among which states – believe themselves to be bound by the moral imperatives to recognize one another as equals (which entails a duty of nonaggression), to promote order and to bring about justice. That said, the claim that international actors deem themselves to be under those obligations does not entail that they are, in fact, morally bound in that particular way. In its early years, the English School made few evaluative pronouncements on the moral norms which, in the views of its then-members, regulate world affairs. More recently, however, scholars of the school such as Hedley Bull, Andrew Linklater, and Nicholas Wheeler have articulated a more explicitly ethical account of the international society, founded (at the very least) on the moral desirability of bringing about and maintaining conditions for a durable peace (Bull 1995; Linklater 2005; Wheeler 1996).
The foregoing picture is deceptively simple, however. For a start, notwithstanding their insistence that the international society is not just made up of states, the latter loom rather large in the world picture drawn by the English School – which in turn raises the difficult question of who counts as a member of the society. The Grotean view, for which the international society comprises all and only those states which are willing to cooperate with other states to bring about order and justice, and to recognize one another as equal, is relatively straightforward. But once NGOs, individuals, and substate political communities are deemed to belong to the international society, an account is needed of the ways in which the ideal and requirement of equal recognition must be both interpreted and manifested. For it is one thing to hold that (for example) the United States does, and ought to, recognize Japan as an equal member; it is quite another to hold that it does, and ought to, recognize the Red Cross as an equal member. Given the disparate powers, rights, and liabilities of those different actors, given too how different their remits are, it is not altogether clear what equal recognition means across those various differences.

Moreover, scholars also and still disagree on the extent to which IR theory can, indeed must, content itself with describing the moral norms and rules by which international actors believe themselves to be bound, or whether it may, or indeed must, venture into deeper normative inquiries. Such inquiries include, inter alia, the legitimacy criteria which a given actor must fulfill in order to belong to the international society, the relative weight to be given to order and justice when those values come into conflict, and the inevitable tensions between, on the one hand, the school’s advocacy of standardly liberal values and, on the other hand, the expansion of the international society to accommodate post-colonial states whose cultures and traditions are not always aligned to Western ideals (Cochran 2008).

Finally, members of the English School disagree as to how thick, or thin, the international society should be – from a set of loosely connected actors unified by a commitment to a minimalist set of moral norms (order, free trade, nonaggression), to a more solidaristic community of equals which can act collectively with a view to enforcing human rights. The issue is particularly salient for understanding how the prescriptive wing of the English School might view the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. On the first account, humanitarian intervention is permitted only in the most serious cases of human rights violations, when crimes are committed which, on the now standard phrase, “shock the conscience of mankind.” On the latter count, intervention might be morally permitted in a wider range of cases, so much so in fact that the establishment of an international peacekeeping corps might well be in order.

**Constructivism**

As we have just seen, the English School pays close attention to the norms by which members of the international society believe themselves to be bound. In this respect, it is similar to yet another dominant stream within IR theory, to wit, constructivism. Constructivism emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s as a response to what its
proponents perceived as realism’s overly materialistic and rationalist explanation of international relations. Across its many variants, constructivism takes as its starting point the view (which it borrows from critical theory; see CRITICAL THEORY) that our world in general, and the realm of international relations in particular, is socially constructed. Whereas realists argue that states’ conduct vis-à-vis one another can be explained solely by reference to exogenously formed interests and material structures such as military capabilities and economic power, constructivists insist that those interests are formed and transformed through states’ interactions within the international system, and that ideational structures (of norms, rules, and beliefs) matter crucially. Thus, suppose that we wanted to understand why the United States and others deem Iran’s nuclear aspirations a threat but are relatively sanguine about Israel’s. To claim that this is because Iran is a long-standing potential enemy and Israel a long-standing ally will not do, since what is at issue is precisely how the United States construes the notions of enemy and friends at this point in time. And how it does it in turn depends on a web of beliefs, past historical experiences, and shared norms which realists do not take properly into account (at least according to constructivists.) Finally, whereas realists understand the realm of international relations to be constituted autonomously and independently of the practices of its actors, constructivists place stress on the processes of mutual reinforcing between agents and structures. To give but one example, prevailing moral norms as held by individual actors between the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dictated against the employment of mercenaries in war. This in turn led to the drafting and adoption by those actors of both domestic legislation and international treaties against mercenarism. Those regulations themselves helped entrench those norms more deeply still in public discourse, and until World War II made it structurally difficult for civilian and military leaders to resort to private military corporations as a tool of foreign policy (Percy 2007).

That said, one should not infer from the foregoing remarks the claim that constructivism, much of which is set initially as a critique of realism, is a natural ally of liberal internationalism. In fact, it rejects the latter’s rationalism just as it opposes realists’. On the constructivist view, norms and rules are no more exogenously given as interests are: they too are socially constructed and contextually tied to time and place (Finnemore 1996; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999).

As should be clear, there is nothing in constructivism which leads its proponents to advocate a particular set of norms in international relations rather than another. Put differently, constructivists unambiguously claim that international actors believe themselves to be bound by moral norms. As theorists of international relations, however, they do not seek to evaluate those norms from a moral point of view; nor do they seek to articulate the norms which ought to govern relations between those actors. Thus, constructivism is no more inherently cosmopolitan than it is communitarian; it no more advocates restraint in war than it commends imperialistic militarism; it is indifferent (qua theory of IR) as between the claim that nations owe duties of assistance to another and the claim that they are entitled always to give priority to the interests of their individual members. Accordingly, while it can offer
powerful accounts as to why international actors sometimes choose to intervene into the affairs of another regime (as they did in Kosovo) and sometimes desist (as they did in Rwanda), it makes no pronouncement on the legitimacy of intervention or the lack of moral justification for nonintervention, either in general or in particular cases. However, constructivists are clear that understanding prevailing moral norms – whichever they are – matters crucially to our understanding of international relations. In this sense, constructivism paved the way, at least in part, for the so-called normative turn in IR theory.

The Normative Turn: The Revival of International Ethics

I began this essay by analyzing liberal internationalism, whose roots as a theory of international relations in its own right go back to World War I. As we saw, it is explicitly and comprehensively prescriptive – whereas neither realism, nor the English School, nor constructivism are. And yet, as we also saw, none of the latter three theories eschew appeal to norms – be it in describing what leaders ought to do for the sake of their fellow citizens, or in analyzing the validating or structuring role which norms play in states’ (or indeed international actors’ in general) relations to one another. The normative turn saw the revival of explicitly normative, or ethical, approaches to IR in the late 1990s onwards. Those approaches do not seek to describe or explain how international actors behave vis-à-vis one another. This is not to say that they are oblivious to the limitations which are imposed both by human nature and the specific circumstances of the international realm; nor are they ignorant of the degree to which international actors already subscribe, or instead reject, the norms which they advocate. But their focus is on providing philosophical justifications for those norms. Interestingly, whereas the aforestudied approaches have been largely developed and taught by scholars of international relations, normative international ethics, or international political theory as it is sometimes called, has found a home in departments and faculties of politics, international relations, law, and philosophy. The body of works which it is generating is enormous. Some of the key issues which it addresses are the following (for book-length accounts and defenses of the normative turn which review the themes I address below, see Brown 2002; Cochran 1999; Hutchings 1999). First and foremost, normativists seek to elucidate which agents should be the fundamental and primary unit of a normative inquiry into international relations: individuals, states, peoples, or substate communities all have their champions, as does the more complex view (resonant with the English School) that relationships between those various entities are the appropriate matter for moral appraisal.

Second, and somewhat relatedly, normativists ask whether national and political borders are relevant from a moral point of view. Thus, cosmopolitans (in many ways the heirs of liberal internationalism) deny that they are and argue, instead, that all human beings have rights to basic freedoms and resources not merely against their own compatriots but also against foreign communities. Others, by contrast, draw
from the communitarian tradition and argue that the special ties which bind compatriots to one another have noninstrumental value, and that compatriots thus have extensive special obligations to one another which often trump the general duties which they are said to have toward distant strangers (see COMMUNITARIANISM; NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM). An important strand of normative IR theory thus pertains to justifications for or against obligations of distributive justice across borders (see GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE), as well as to the ethics of immigration policy (see IMMIGRATION).

Third, normativists have revisited many of the questions which were at the heart of the liberal international agenda, such as the normative foundations for political self-determination and the permissibility of the recourse to military force as a tool of foreign policy (see JUST WAR THEORY, HISTORY OF). At the crossroads of those two issues, humanitarian intervention (the issue itself, its (non)instantiations as manifested in the failure of the international community to act in Rwanda in 1994, and in the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo) has spawned a voluminous literature.

Fourth, normativists have begun writing on climate change, population control, and environmental justice – phenomena and practices, in other words, which raise transborder ethical issues as well as issues of justice toward future generations (see CLIMATE CHANGE; INTERGENERATIONAL ETHICS).

The list, such as it is, is far from being exhaustive. It outlines some features of current research agendas. But it also offers lines of thought for future inquiry, of which I should like to mention the following. The first one touches on the question of actors. As we saw throughout, the subject matter of international relations is standardly thought to be states and their conduct vis-à-vis one another, yet one of the lessons to be learnt from the English School in particular is that a multiplicity of international actors coexist alongside states, not merely multistate international organizations but also nongovernmental organizations and corporations, many of whose actions have considerable bearing on individuals’ well-being. One need only think of polluting firms at one polar extreme or the Red Cross at another extreme to drive the point home. It behooves normativists to provide an ethical framework for understanding how public and private actors ought to interact with one another on the world stage, and for delineating what obligations they owe, if any at all, to third parties across borders.

Another important area for inquiry is that of the justification for the norms which ought to govern international relations, and in particular of the degree to which such justifications can or indeed ought to be genuinely cross-cultural. Relatedly, of crucial importance too is the question of the degree to which universal norms, if there are any, can or ought to be enforced by states acting unilaterally, by international institutions, or both. The issue arises not merely with respect to military intervention but also with respect to the question of punishment for transborder criminal offenses such as war crimes or weapons trafficking.

Finally, it matters a great deal who is under what duties to whom – whether (at one end of the scale) in the international realm corporate agents are under duties to other corporate agents, or whether (at the other end of the scale) all moral agents,
irrespective of where they are, have certain obligations to all other such agents, irrespective of where the latter are. To give but one example, it is one thing to say that states and firms are under obligations to structure their activities in such a way as to minimize the impact of their polluting activities on other countries; it is quite another to claim that individuals in their private capacity are under a moral obligation to buy carbon-offsetting vouchers whenever they book a flight, for example. It matters a great deal, in other words, whether international relations ultimately are relations between states, or relations between human beings.

See also: CLIMATE CHANGE; COMMUNITARIANISM; COSMOPOLITANISM; CRITICAL THEORY; GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE; GROTIUS, HUGO; HOBBES, THOMAS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; IMMIGRATION; INTERGENERATIONAL ETHICS; JUST WAR THEORY; HISTORY OF; KANT, IMMANUEL; MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ; NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM; POWER; ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES

REFERENCES


**FURTHER READINGS**


